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by Elizabeth F. Potter 
If, In countlng, I forget that the untts, whtch now hover before me, have been added to one 
another In successton, I should never know that a total 13 belng produced through this 
successive addltlon of untt to untt, and so would remaln ignorant of the number For the 
concept of the number is nothing but the consclousness of this unity of synthests 
The word 'concept' mtght of ~tself suggest this remark For t h ~ s  unitary consciousness is 
what combines the manifold, successively ~ntuited, and thereupon also reproduced, Into one 
representatton Thts consclousness may often be only fatnt, so that we do not connect it wrth 
the generarrort of the representation, but only wlth the outcome . But notwithstanding 
these varldtlons, such consclousness, however indistinct, must always be present, without 
it, concepts, and therew~th knowledge of objects, are altogether ~mposs~ble (A 103-104) 
In these remarks Kant suggests that a consciousness connected with the 
generation of a representation is necessary for the possibility of knowledge in 
addition to consciousness of the outcome of the generation, that is, conscious- 
ness of the representation itseIf. Synthesis is the title for this generation of our 
knowledge, and many commentators have interpreted synthesis as a process 
of which we are conscious. The interpretation is encouraged by references such 
as the ones to synthesis as an "act" (Handlung); for example, at B 130, Kant 
says that combination, or synthesis, is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of 
representation, and it is difficult to imagine that he used the term without 
realizing that it entails the notion of an agent and that an agent must always 
in some sense be conscious or aware of his own acts. 
Commentators inclined to this interpretation have given many cases of 
synthesis in which we do  consciously perform an act or go through a process 
of apprehending, associating and/or remembering, and finally, recognizing an 
object. Thus R. P.  Wolff describes the case of someone coming to realize that 
what is before him is a forest; he sees first an oak, then a birch (and says to 
himself, "there is a birch; and there is an elm, plus the birch which I remember, 
etc."' Having the concept 'forest,' he knows what counts as part of a forest, 
and after apprehending individual trees, he recognizes them as a forest. 
Difficulty first arises, however, over those cases such as the one H. J. Paton 
 present^,^ in which he says that when I recognize a body, I apprehend first 
extension, then impenetrability, etc., and recognize a body. The concept 'body' 
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tells us which properties to associate as a body. Clearly Paton does not mean 
to suggest that we recognize the properties of a body before recognizing a body, 
for that would be impossible; he seems to  be pointing, instead, to that group 
of cases in which we take note of the features of an object before we are able 
to recognize it. Such cases usually occur when we are uncertain whether the 
object before us is one to which a particular concept applies (perhaps because 
it is difficult to tell whether this is an X, or because we have only just learned 
the concept 'X'). 
But what about cases in which we are not aware of such a process, and 
indeed, have no reason to believe that such a process occurs? These are the 
common cases. Puzzling objects and new concepts are relatively infrequent in 
our lives; we do  not puzzle over our children's faces or our furniture; we 
recognize these, and indeed most things in our lives, instantly. 
When the investigation reaches this point, we can go in either of two 
directions: 1) we can argue as Locke does in a similar connection that such 
a process must go on, but "so constantly and so quick" that we never notice 
it,%r with Kemp-Smith that the process is preconscious and that we can be 
aware only of its outcome,* or 2) we begin anew and read Kant's doctrine of 
threefold synthesis as a series of remarks about the necessary relations between 
certain concepts. The twin objections that the majority of cases of knowing or 
recognizing things are not ones in which we come to recognize them and that 
preconscious synthesis as Kemp-Smith presents it is unverifiable in principle 
have led many, with Strawson, to draw back from what he terms the "myth" 
of "transcendental idealism" and from "the imaginary subject of transcenden- 
tal psychology"' and to take the second alternative above. 
These objections to reading Kant as offering a theory of mental activity of 
a certain sort are well taken. We do  not, as P. F. Strawson points out, have 
"empirical knowledge of the occurrence of that which is held to be the anteced- 
ent condition of empirical k n ~ w l e d g e , " ~  and one may, as Jonathan Bennett 
notes, assign properties to an object without "enduring a period of agnosticism 
which is ended by my coming to realize that . . ., or  coming to the conclusion 
that . . .".' Nor, as Graham Bird shows, need we engage in any act or series 
of acts of recalling to mind either individually o r  as a whole our cigarettes 
while counting them, or our past perceptions of a room when we recognize it 
as the same room we saw b e f ~ r e . ~  
Furthermore, the interpretation of Kant's argument in the First Critique as 
an analysis of the dependence and interdependence of certain concepts is not 
to  be denied. The doctrine of synthesis offers a wealth of such insights. Straw- 
son argues for example that the concept of 'experience' entails the concept of 
'objectivity' which entails a 'necessary connectedness of experiences.' This, in 
turn, entails certain concepts, 'substance,' 'cause,' and 'person,' which provide 
the necessary connectedness of experiences. When he discusses the doctrine of 
synthesis specifically, he suggests that included in this doctrine is the point that 
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we could not take any one perception as a perception of an object unless we 
can and do  take other possible perceptions as perceptions of that object, or as 
he puts it, "there would be no question of counting any transient perception 
as a perception of an enduring and distinct object unless we are prepared or 
ready to count some different perceptions as perceptions of one and the same 
enduring and distinct object."' In his article, "Imagination and Perception," 
however, Strawson further suggests that one role of imagination in synthesis 
is, as he puts it, to represent non-actual (that is, past or possible future) 
perceptions in a present perception.1° In an attempt to describe this presence 
of non-actual perceptions in a present perception, he says that past perceptions 
are "alive" in the present one," or "the actual occurrent perception of an 
enduring object as an object of a certain kind, is, as it were, soaked with or 
animated by, or infused with . . . the thought of other past or possible percep- 
tions of the same object."'" 
Although he does not give a hard argument for the further point, one is 
sympathetic to it. When I see, with a feeling of annoyance, the dog in my 
garden, that is, when I make the judgment "there is a dog," perhaps even 
before I make the judgment, "there is that wretched dog again," the feeling 
of annoyance incident upon my perception arises because memories of that dog 
digging up my garden are somehow hovering at the edges of, somehow present, 
though unattended, in my perception of the dog. 
In his discussion, Strawson is concerned with the synthesis or combination 
of various perceptions of an object (that is, perceptions of the same object at 
different times) and with the sense in which we are conscious of non-actual 
perceptions of an object when we are conscious of or having a present percep- 
tion of it. However, if we begin to examine the possible cases of synthesis, we 
find that Kant is concerned with more than one kind. We can, I think, 
distinguish at least four possible kinds of synthesis: I )  Cases of the combination 
of perceptions of different objects to yield a compIex object. W o l f s  example 
in which one successively apprehends, remembers, and associates various trees 
as a forest is a case of this sort. 2) Cases of the combination of perceptions of 
parts of an object to yield the object; for example, one has only just learned 
the concept 'broom' and must pause and consider whether this object has a 
handle and straws before deciding that it is, indeed, a broom. (Cases of this 
kind are a species of case 1 above.) 3) Cases of the combination or association 
of various perceptions of an object as perceptions of one enduring object (this 
is the kind of synthesis with which Strawson is concerned, as was noted above). 
4) Cases of the combination of (perceptions of) properties of an object to yreld 
the object. Cases of this sort will be discussed below. 
The first three sorts of case can be characterized as syntheses of perceptions 
of objects, whereas case 4 is a synthesis of perceptions of properties of objects. 
Perhaps we should also note that the third group of cases are those of combina- 
tion according to the category of Substance; that is, being able to carry out a 
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synthesis of this sort is necessary for recognizing something as a substance (= 
an enduring object). The others are descriptions of syntheses for which empiri- 
cal concepts serve as the rules. Kant's exposition of threefold synthesis is an 
outline of both empirical synthesis (synthesis necessary for the application of 
empirical concepts) and pure synthesis (that necessary for the application of 
categories). 
In the following, I will attempt to draw together the issues mentioned above 
and to show that an empirical synthesis of properties of objects is necessary 
for the knowledge or recognition of any object (synthesis 4 above) and that this 
synthesis involves consciousness connected with the generation of a represen- 
tation, different from consciousness of the representation, though not, as some 
commentators have thought, a consciousness of the generation process itself. 
The argument is intended to account for the synthesis involved in the instanta- 
neous recognition of objects and should clear up some of the confusion regard- 
ing exactly what we are conscious of when we synthesize objects instantly. 
In the exposition of the unity of synthesis at A 104ff, Kant points out that 
the concept 'object' (the object in general = X) is the concept of a necessary 
unity of representations and that only when we have produced synthetic unity 
in the manifold of representations can we be said to know an object. This 
remark holds for all empirical concepts of specific objects; they are all concepts 
of a necessary unity of representations, and only when we have produced a 
unity in the manifold of representations can we be said to know an object as 
a specific kind of object. In his discussion, Kant presents the concepts 'triangle' 
and 'body' as rules for the unity of properties. When we think of a triangle as 
an object, he says, we are conscious of the combination of three straight Iines 
(in certain relations), and the concept 'body,' he says, necessitates the represen- 
tatlons of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc. (A 105-106). 
Undeniably the concept 'body' entails the concepts 'extended,' 'impenetra- 
ble,' etc., and further, anyone able properly to apply the concept 'body' must 
be able to apply the concepts 'extended,' 'impenetrable,' and so on.13 But is 
this the whole story here? Part of what is meant by saying that we cannot apply 
'body' unless we can apply these further concepts is that we cannot recognize 
a body unless we can recognize the properties of extension, etc. But is it 
sufficient for the application of 'body' that we merely be capable of appIying 
'extended,' etc.? Is it not also necessary that we in fact apply the concepts 
'extended,' 'impenetrable,' or  'having shape' to a phenomenon when we recog- 
nize it as a body? The supposition here is that we recognize an object by (some 
of) its properties: its shape, its size, color, texture, and so forth. Of course, we 
need not apprehend all of its properties (indeed, we need not know them all) 
in order to recognize an object, but we must apprehend some, for if we do not 
perceive the shape, or the size, o r  the color, or anything else, we cannot 
recognize the object. In seeing (or otherwise perceiving) an object, we must see 
some of its properties. 
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Seeing properties in seeing an object is a species of experience of which we 
are not explicitly aware or conscious, a problem approached by Kant, I believe, 
in his discussion of the necessary consciousness of the generation (Erzeugung) 
of representations. The cases which present themselves as candidates for the 
description "experience of which we are not (explicitly) conscious" cover a 
wide range. The obvious ones are feelings such as jealousy of which we are 
unaware. Related to these are cases of physical unease such as a vague feeling 
of discomfort which becomes specific when the chess game ends (I am thinking 
here, not of a case in which I am totally unaware at time A of a pain and at 
time B suddenly become aware of it, but of a case in which I am inclined to  
say afterwards, "I was bothered by a nagging feeling during the game and the 
moment it ended I realized that my back ached miserably"). Comprising 
perhaps the largest group are cases of what might be referred to as negotiating 
one's way through the world without constantly attending it. These are the 
myriad cases of walking up stairs while thinking about something else entirely, 
holding pen in hand and writing with it while concentrating upon the argu- 
ment I am constructing, etc. These cases are sometimes described as "auto- 
matic" or "unconscious," but clearly they are nothing like the blinking of the 
eyes o r  breathing which better deserve that description. 
I offer as candidates for the description "experiences of which we are not 
(explicitly) conscious" those cases of perceiving and recognizing objects in 
virtue of certain of their features or properties without making explicit judg- 
ment about (being explicitly aware of) those properties. The following would 
be such a case: taking a walk, I come upon a field of daffodils; I recognize them 
as such, but make no judgment regarding their shape o r  size. Though I do not 
attend their size or shape, however, I surely must, at some level, be conscious 
of them, for they are features distinguishing daffodils from buttercups. If I 
were totally unaware of their size or shape (if I were, for instance, too far away 
to distinguish these features), I would not make any judgment as to  what 
species of yellow flower I see (though I might decide that these are daffodils, 
even though I cannot see them clearly, on the basis of my knowledge that the 
onIy yellow flowers growing in this area are daffodils). 
The point can be made by falling back on specific verbs of perception; we 
can use any verb of perception, for example, "see," in (at Ieast) two ways1*: 
I can be said to see, a chair when, looking at a chair, I make the judgment,15 
"This is a chair"; my attention is taken up by this judgment. But 1 can also 
be said to see2 some of the properties of the chair in seeing, the chair. In this 
usage, I do not make intentional judgments such as "this is a seat," "this is 
brown," or "this has legs," and so on. I am not, so to say, explicitly aware of 
the properties as I am of the chair. I do  not, in traditional terminology, intend 
its properties when I judge this to be a chair (though I might upon occasion). 
In order to recognize an object, I must perceive some of the properties of that 
object. 
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It follows then, as Kant tells us in his discussion of concepts as rules, that 
part of having a concept is knowing certain of the properties of the objects to 
which the concept applies. The characterization of concepts as "rules" (Regeln) 
indicates that concepts provide order and regularity. A concept provides order 
by determining which representations or properties shall be united and recog- 
nized as an object, and it provides regularity inasmuch as it necessitates that 
the same properties be synthesized as properties of an object more than once. 
Representations cannot go together now in one order, now in another. We 
cannot, if we are to recognize an object, see it as being now one shape, now 
another, now one color, now another.16 
Kant presents an outline (at A 98Q of two basic sorts of synthesis, empirical 
and pure, under which fall many kinds of case, among them, we have argued, 
an empirical synthesis of the properties of an object necessary for its recogni- 
tion. This kind of synthesis has as its "outcome" consciousness or recognition 
of some object, but it entails, we have argued, a consciousness, not of the 
generation "process" itself (that stilI remains, in a sense, mysterious), but a 
consciousness connected with the generation, that is, a consciousness of the 
properties of the objects recognized. In some cases of synthesis, we recognize 
a complex object by the successive awareness of the objects which comprise 
its parts. In these cases we may be said to be conscious of the generation of, 
or the process of coming to recognize, the object. But in cases of the instanta- 
neous recognition of an object, there is no process of generation. How does 
Kant's remark that there IS a consciousness distinct from consciousness of the 
object, yet connected with the generation of the recognition of that object, 
apply to these cases? The instantaneous recognition of any object necessarily 
involves, as we have seen, the (implicit) consciousness, though not the inten- 
tion (or explicit consciousness) of its properties. The interpretation presented 
here, I believe, falls between interpretations of synthesis as a conscious or 
mental process, on the one hand, and as an analysis of the interdependence of 
certain concepts, on the other. In fact, of course, not even Strawson presents 
a strictly conceptual analysis of synthesis. In The Bounds of Sense, he never 
deals with the question of exactly how the special concepts of an 'enduring 
object' or 'causality,' etc., provide the connectedness necessary for the possibil- 
ity of experience, but clearly there are only two ways that connectedness of 
perceptions can arise. Either the perceptions somehow occur or are given in 
a connected fashion, or they must be connected by the subject of experience. 
When he later addresses the question of how necessary connectedness arises 
in our experience, for exampIe in "Imagination and Perception," he too de- 
parts from a strictly conceptual analysis and deals with necessary psychologi- 
cal activities. Further, in that article, he remarks that we do not call to mind 
past or possible perceptions of an object in a present perception of it, but he 
wants to say, nevertheless, that non-actual perceptions are somehow "al~ve in" 
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present ones. It seems to me that he is either making the point that whenever 
we have a perception of and are explicitly conscious of an object, we are, so 
to say, implicitly conscious of, or conscious at a different level of, non-actual 
perceptions of it; or he is pointing out in an odd way that if we forgot absolutely 
our past experiences of an object and were unable to imagine any possible 
experiences of it, we would be unable to have a present experience of it. The 
latter point seems to me an obvious one, but the former needs an argument 
such as the one presented here for experiences of properties in the perceptions 
of objects. 
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